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Mr, Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk, Utah State Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

S & G, Inc. vs. State Engineer
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 860555

Dear Mr. Butler:
As authorized by Rule 24(j), Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court we respectfully request that you invite consideration by
the Supreme Court as a supplemental authority the case of Stanley
B. Bonham, et al. vs. Robert L. Morgan, State Engineer, et al.
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8,
P.2d
, Supreme Court Case No. 880143
as a Decision both pertinent and significant respecting the
issues in the captioned case.
The case was decided February 23, 1989 and published in
102 Utah Advance Reports at page 8; however, it does not yet have
a West's Pacific Reporter citation.
The Bonham case has
significant relevance to the issue of "standing" in its holding
that a Plaintiff may pursue litigation even though specified
water rights being litigated might not be vested in the name of
the Interested Person as that term is refined by the Bonham case.
Attached are an additional nine (9) copies of this
letter to this and to each of which is attached a copy of the
Bonham case as reported in U.A.R. with a copy to counsel.
Yours very respectfully,
OLSEN, MclFF & CHAMBERLAIN

By
Ken Chamberlain
KC:sb
Attachments
cc: Michael M. Quealy, w/attachment
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Barton, 93 Wash 2d 301, 305, 609 P 2d 1353. 1356
(1980) (en bine) ("An habitual criminal supplemental sentencing information becomes part of the
original fdony, and provides increased punishment
for the latest offense/); Schuler v. State, 668 P 2d
1333, 1340 (Wyo. 1963) f i t is improper to impose
two sentences, one for the underlying fdony, and
one for the habitual charges. *).
47. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1985)
(quoting State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah
1978)); see also State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 37,
268 P.2d 998, 1000 (1954) ("to be charged with
being an habitual criminal is not to be charged with
a crime'), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Stanley B. BONHAM and Anne M. Bonham,
Boyd F. Summerbays, and Arteen M.
Summerhays,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Robert L. MORGAN, Utah State Engineer,
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District,
a Political Subdivision of the State of Utah
gad a Body Corporate, t a d Draper Irrigation
Company, t Utah Corporation,
Defendants and Appellee.
No. S80143
FILED: February 23, 1989
Third District, SaJt Lake County
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
ATTORNEYS:
James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for
appellants
R. Paul Van Dam, Michael M. Quealy, John
H. Mabey, Jr., Salt Lake City, for the Utah
State Engineer
LeRoy S. AxJand, Carl F. Huefner, Kendrick
J. Hafen, SaJt Lake City, for SaJt Lake
Water Conservancy District
Lee KapaJoski, David L. Deisley, SaJt Lake
City, for Draper Irrigation Company
William J. Lockhart, Salt Lake City, for
National Parks and Conservation
Association
Dailin W. Jensen, SaJt Lake City, for Weber
and Davis Counties Canal Company
Edward W. Clyde, SaJt Lake City, for Central
Utah Water Conservancy District
Joseph Novak, SaJt Lake City, for Provo
River Water Users Association
Ray L. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Salt
Lake City

Thorpe A. Waddmgham, Delta, for Delta
CanaJ
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment
which denied than standing to pursue count one
of their complaint against the state engineer. The
summary judgment wis certified final under rule
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to vest
this Court with jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
See Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3Xe)(v) (Supp.
198*).
Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham, who is not a
water user, protested against a permanent change
application filed under Utah Code Ann. §73-33 (1980H in the office of the defendant state
engineer (state engineer) in June of 1984 by defendants Salt Lake County Water Conservancy
District and Draper Irrigation Company
(applicants). Applicants sought to change the
point of diversion, place, and nature of use of
certain water rights in Bell Canyon, Dry Creek,
Rocky Mouth Creek, and Big Willow Creek. At a
subsequent hearing, Bonham produced evidence
of substantial flooding and damage to plaintiffs'
properties and adjacent public lands during 1983
and 1984. Bonham informed the state engineer
that the flooding was the result of applicants'
construction of a screw gate, pipeline, and diversion works after they obtained preliminary approval of their change application. According to
Bonham, the flooding had occurred and would
recur on a yearly basis whenever the applicants
closed their screw gate, allowing the waters to be
diverted down the hillside onto plaintiffs' properties and nearby property contemplated for use
as a public park. Bonham objected that the proposed structures and improvements contemplated
after final approval would detrimentally impact
the public welfare.
The state engineer conducted on-site inspections but eventually issued his memorandum decision in which he concluded that he wa* without
authority to address Bonham's claims in ruling
on the permanent change application, as Bonham
was not a water user, that the state engineer's
authority was limited to investigating impairments
of vested water rights, and that there was no
evidence before him to indicate that the implementation of the change application would impair
those rights. The state engineer then granted the
permanent change application.
Plaintiffs sued in the district court in compliance with Utah Code Ann. §73-3-14 (1980),
which provides in pertinent pan:
In any case where a decision of the
state engineer is involved any person
aggrieved by such decision may within
sixty days after notice thereof bring a
civil action in the district court for a
plenary review thereof.... (N)otice of
the pendency of such action ... shall
operate to stay all further proceedings
pending the decision of the district
court.
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responsibilities
outlined
m
section
73-3-8
did
('Emphasis added ) In count one of their complnot apply to permanent . nangc applications
aint, they claimed that the state engineer failed to
covered by section 73-3-3. At oral argument,
review the plans and specifications of the improvements, failed to conduct an investigation as the parties conceded that the question of whether
required by Utah Code Ann. §73-34 (19*5) plaintiffs are aggrieved persons within the
meaning of section 71-1-14 turns on whether
to determine what damage the change application
the scope of the considerations appropriate for
would have on private and public property, and
the state engineer voder a section 71-3-3 profailed to comply with section 73-3-3 (1910) by
ceeding for a permanent change application is the
not considering the 'duties' of the defendant
same as that listed in section 73-34. If it is,
applicants. Plaintiff! alleged that the state engithe state engineer concedes that plaintiffs are
neer's disclaimer of any authority to consider, in
connection with a permanent change application, aggrieved persons; if M is not, plaintiffs concede
any damages caused to plaintiffs as a result of his that they are not aggrieved persons and that
approval of the application, was contrary to the summary judgment was proper. The issues before
dear mandate of section 73-3-8, which requires us may therefore be reduced to the question of
an evaluation of the factors there set out, inclu- whether in permanent change applications (section
ding any and all damage to public and private 73-3-3) the state engineer has Che same duties
property and the impact the application will have with respect to approval or rejection of applications as be has when considering appropriation
on the public welfare. Plaintiffs also alleged that
applications (section 73-34). We hold that the
they had owned and occupied their approximately
ten acres of property for twenty yean and that
state engineer's duties under the two statutes are
for the approximately one hundred years since
the same and that plaintiffs therefore are aggriDraper Irrigation first constructed open ditches,
eved persons entitled to a trial on the merits of
flumes, pipelines, and other aqueducts to carry
count one of their complaint.
water from Bell Canyon Reservoir to its water
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment
treatment plant in Draper, Utah, plaintiffs* propresents for review conclusions of law only,
perties had remained undisturbed. Since the conbecause, by definition, summary judgments do
struction of the screw gates, in furtherance of the
not resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those
applied-for change, that was no longer the case.
conclusions for correctness, without according
Virtual waterfalls cascaded down the hillside
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
immediately east of plaintiffs' properties whenMadscn v. Borthkk, 97 Utah Adv. Rep 13 (1988).
ever applicants dosed that gate and caused tremThat same lack of deference applies to the trial
endous damage to plaintiffs' properties and the court's interpretation of statutes, which likewise
public area in the vicinity.
poses a question of law. Amy r, WmMm, 751
P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).
Before any discovery was conducted, the distUtah Code Ann, §73.3-3 (1980),* at the
rict court granted the state engineer's motion for
time the state engineer rendered, his decision,, read
summary judgment after concluding that the
in pertinent part:
change application process under section 73-3-3
cud not contemplate a consideration of all the
Any person entitled to the use of
factors listed in section 73-3-8; that the issues
water may change the place of diverraised by plaintiffs were outside the limited critsion or use and may use the water for
eria governing approval and rejection of change
other purposes than those for which it
applications contained in section 73-3-3; and
was originally appropriated, but no
that plaintiffs were, therefore, not 'aggrieved
such change shall be made if it impairs
persons" within the meaning of section 73-3-14 ]
any vested right without just compc-'
and could not bring an action to review the decinsation. Such changes may be permsion of the state engineer under section 73-3-3. :
anent or temporary. Changes for an
The summary judgment lifted the stay imposed by
indefinite length of time with an intesection 73-3-14 on the approval of the permantion to relinquish the original point
nent change application. The order was certified
of diversion, place or purpose of use
as final under rule 54<b) of the Utah Rules of
are defined as permanent changes. TemCivil Procedure.
porary changes include and are
Plaintiffs appealed. This Court granted the ,
limbed to all changes for definitely
request of the National Parks and Conservation
Nu-o periods of not exceeding one
Association (NPCA) to intervene as amicus curiae
>car Both permanent and temporary
and granted a like request by Weber Basin Water
.-.j'*rs of point of diversion, place or
Conservancy District, Weber River Water Users
. ;:;i-»e of use of water including
Association, Davis and Weber Counties Canal
*ater involved in general adjudication
Company, Draper Irrigation Company, Sandy
>r other suits, shall he made in the
City, Central Utah Water Conservancy District,
>i3nrv* provided herein and not oth- • •
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District,
and Provo River Water I Isers Association (the
No permanent change shall be made
water users).
<
except on the approval of an applicaPlaintiffs assigned errors in the trial court's
tion therefor by the state engineer.... The
ruling that (1) summary judgment in favor of the
procedure
in the state
engineer's
state engineer was proper, (2) plaintiffs were not
office and rights ind duties of the
"aggrieved persons" within the meaning of section !
applicants with respect to applications
73-3-14; and (3) the state engineer's duties and
Pmm. {*+
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for permanent changes of point of
diversion, place or purpose of use
shall be the same as provided in this
title for applications to appropriate
water, but the state engineer may, in
connection with application* for permanent change involving only a
change in point of diversion of 660
feet or tew, waive the necessity for
publishing notice of such applications.
No temporary change shall be made
except upon an application filed in
duplicate with the state engineer....
The state engineer shall make an investigation and if such temporary
change dots not impair any vested
rights of others he shall make an order
authorizing the change.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 73-3-8 (1985), at the time the state
engineer rendered his decision, read in pertinent
part:
(1) It shall be the duty of the state
engineer to approve an application if:
(a) there is unappropriated water in
the proposed source; (b) the proposed
use wiii not impair existing rights or
interfere with the more beneficial use
of the water; (c) the proposed plan is
physically and economically feasible,
unless the application is filed by the
United States Bureau of Reclamation,
and would not prove detrimental to
the public welfare; (d) the applicant
has the financial ability to complete
the proposed works; and (e) the application was filed in good fajth and
not for purposes of speculation or
monopoly. If the state engineer,
because of information in his possession obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise, has reason to
believe that an applicauon to appropriate water will interfere with its
more beneficial use for irrigation,
domestic or culinary, stock watering,
power or mining development
or
manufacturing, or will unreasonably
affect public recreation or the natural
stream environment, or will prove
detrimental to the public welfare, it is
his duty to withhold his approval or
rejection of the application until he
has investigated the matter. If an
application does not meet the requirements of this section, it shall be rejected.
(Emphasis added.)
Although the two statutes before us have remained virtually unchanged in their substantive
provisions for over fifty years, the issue whether
the state engineer must consider ail the factors
listed in section 73-3-8 when passing on a
permanent change application under section 73*33 is one of first impression in this Court. We are,
therefore, unable to draw on prior decisions from
this Court except to the extent that they contain

Rtpl
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appropriate dicta or other pertinent comments on
the sututes under consideration. Nor is case law
from other jurisdictions helpful, as none of the
cases cited by the state engineer deals with the
type of cross-reference contained in our statutes.
Our best sources for addressing the question,
therefore, are the statutes themselves rend in
harmony with other statutes under the same and
related chapters. In construing these statutes, we
attempt to ascertain legislative intent behind
ambiguous language and rely on the plain language of the statutes where no ambiguity exists.
Williams v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co.,
763 P.2d 796 (Utah 1988); P.I.E. Employees
Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144
(Utah 1988). Unambiguous language in the statute
may not be interpreted to contradict its plain
meaning. Johnson v. State Retirement Board, 91
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Sept. 19,1988).
We agree with the position taken by plaintiffs
and the NPCA that both statutory purposes and a
reasonable textual interpretation of water allocation statutes support the application of appropriation criteria to permanent change applications.
The language critical to our determination was
added to section 100-3-3, R.S. Utah 1933, in
1937. See L. 1937, ch. 130, §1. The amendment
removed provisions addressing notice requirements3 and added for the first time language defining permanent and temporary changes. After
setting out procedures relating to applications for
permanent changes, the 1937 amendment continued:
The procedure in the state engineer's
office and the rights and duties of the
applicant with respect to application
c
or permanent changes of point of
diversion, place, or purpose of use shall be
che same as provided
in this
itle for applications to appropriate
water.
(Emphasis added.)
The remaining amendments to section 100-33 dealt with procedures relating 4 to temporary
changes, criteria for rejecting applications for
both permanent and temporary changes, procedures with respect to types of changes, and finality
of the sute engineer's decision and penalties for
changes without following statutory prescriptions.
In essence, the substantive provisions enacted in
1937 remain unchanged to date.
The appropriations statute, section 100-3-8,
R.S. Utah 1933, to which the amendment made
cross-reference, contained then, as section 73-38 does now, a specification on the duties of the
state engineer when acting on appropriation
applications. These were to be granted if, and
only if, they did not interfere with more beneficial
use, public recreation, the natural stream environment, or the public welfare, as more specifically
set out in the statute. In contrast to the crossreference between permanent change applications
and appropriations, the 193T amendments prescribed different and very summary procedures for temporary changes, under which the state engineer 'shall make an investigation and // such
temporary change does not impair any vested
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rights of other*, he shall mike an order authorizing the change." See also §73-3-3 (1980).
From these contrasting references and procedures,
we draw the rational inference that in temporary
change applications the review criteria (now contained in lection 73-3-1) did not apply, hut in
considerations of permanent change applications
they did. That same inference was drawn by
Justice Wolfe in dictum in Moyk v. Sa/r Ukc Cky9
111 Utah 201, 225, 17* P.2d 182, 195
(1947), on other grounds in a case that determined the propriety of an award for a temporary
taking of water rights under an abandoned condemnation proceeding:
It should be noted that in case of an
application for a permanent change as
compared to a temporary change the
procedure shall be the same as is
provided for in applications to appropriate water. Section 100-3-8,
U.C.A. 1943, declares when it shall be
the duty of the State Engineer to
approve an application. The right of
the applicant is not absolute. The
Engineer is required to determine
certain facts some of which involve the
element of judgment. In the case of an
application for a temporary change of
use the Engineer "Shall make an order
authorizing the change* Mf such
temporary change does not impair any
vested rights of others.* ... [T]he word
'shall* is used in section 100-3-3
only in connection with an application
for a temporary change of place of
diversion or place or purpose of use.
(Emphasis in original.)
Plaintiffs and the NPCA point out that Justice
Wolfe's interpretation of the permanent change
application statute also relied upon the predecessors of Utah Code Ann. §73-1-1 (1980), "[a]ll
waters in this state, whether above or under the
ground are heTcby declared lo be the property of
the public, subject to aiJ existing rights to the use
thereof/ and of Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3
(1980), 'tbleneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of all rights to the use of
water in this state/ Plaintiffs and the NPCA, like
Justice Wolfe, rery on those general provisions to
underscore their position that neither the right to
appropriate water nor the right to permanently
change its use or place of use is absolute. The
conditioning of that right, they say, was acknowledged by our Supreme Court in United States
v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 502-03, 231 P. 434,
439(1924), when it stated:
(Appellants' right to change the place
of diversion is not an absolute or
vested right, but is only a conditional
or qualified one. No such change can
be made if thereby the public, or any
other appropriator, prior or subsequent, is adversely affected. See aJso Tanner
v. Humphreys,
87 Utah 164,
168, AS P.2d 484, AS6 (1935) (plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that the approval of
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her permanent change application
would not be detrimental to the public
welfare).
Even were we convinced, which we are not, by
the state engineer's argument that the 'procedure
in the state engineer's office* in section 73-3-3
refers only to his ministerial duties, the lack of
precision in the croas-reference is of Bttk avail
to the state engineer. The further mention in that
section of the 'rights and dudes* of the appticants and the reference to section 73-34 are
sufficient by themselves to show that the legislature meant to require more than similar procedures alone. The only reasonable meaning to read
into section 73-3-3 is that the state engineer
must investigate and reject the application for
either appropriation or permanent change of use
or place of use if approval would interfere with
more beneficial use, public recreation, the natural
stream environment, or the public welfare, it is
unreasonable to assume that the legislature would
require the state engineer to investigate matters of
public concern in water appropriations and yet
restrict him from undertaking those duties in
permanent change applications. Carried to its
logical conclusion, such an interpretation would
eviscerate the duties of the state engineer under
section 73-3-8 and allow an applicant to accomplish in a two-step process what the statute
proscribes in a one-step process. For ail that an
applicant would need to do to achieve a disapproved purpose under section 73-34 would be to
appropriate for an approved purpose and then to
file a change application under section 73-M.
Our interpretation that the state engineer's duty
to investigate both appropriation and permanent
change applications for interference with public
use is validated by plain language found in the
three protest statutes in chapter 3 of title 73, Utah
Code Ann. §73-3-7, §73-3-13, and §733-14. Section 73-3-7 permits 'any person
interested/ not just a water user or an owner of
vested rights, to protest the granting of an application under title 73-ergo, for appropriation or
change- "which shall be duly considered by
the state engineer.* Section 73-3-14 permits
'any person aggrieved* by the state engineer's
decision to bring a civil action in the district court
for plenary review of the decision. In contrast to
those, two protest statutes, section 73-3-13
restricts the right to protest the lack of diligence
in construction of water works and in the application of water to beneficial use to 'any other
applicant or any user of water from any river
s>stem or water source." It would stand to reason
that the legislature would have placed the tame
limiting language in sections 73-3-7 and 73-314 had that been its intent. The distinction is
deliberate, not inadvertent, and does not comport
with the sute engineer's interpretation. Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning. Johnson v.

State

Retirement

Board, 91 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 9.
We hold that the state engineer is required to
undertake the same investigation in permanent
change applications that the starute mandates in
applications for water appropriations and that
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plaintiffs arc aggrieved persons who have standing
to sue him for negligence in performing his statutory duties. The summary judgment in favor of
the state engineer is vacated, and plaintiffs'
complaint against him reinsuted for thai on the
merits.
Jackson, Court of Appeals Judge, dissents.
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, having
disqualified himself, does not participate herein;
Norman H. Jackson, Court of Appeals Judge,
sat.
1. Here, as well as in the following, we confine our
analysis to the versions of the statutes in effect on
December 26, 1985, the date of the state engineer's
memorandum decision.
2. This section was passed in 1937 and has undergone slight changes twice since 1959, L. 1986 ch. 40,
§1; L. 1987 ch. 161, §289, but still retains the
same 1937 language that is determinant to our decision in this case.'
3. They now appear in Utah Code Ann. §73-3-6
(1980).
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IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Marie SERPENTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 870422-CA
FILED: February 9, 1989
Fifth Circuit, Salt Lake County
Honorable William A. Thome
ATTORNEYS:
Candice A. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
David E. Yocom, Rodwicke Ybarra, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Marie Serpentc appeals her conviction of lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §769-702.5 (1988). Ms. Serpcnte claims the raising
of her dress and slight exposure of her covered
buttocks does not constitute "exposure* or rise to
the level of an 'act of gross lewdness" under §769-702.5. We agree, and reverse Ms. Serpente's
conviction.
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FACTS
On April 2, 1986, Ms. Serpente's son was detained after school. Following his detention, he
walked home in the dark, fell, and injured his
ankle. Two days later, Ms. Serpente went to her
son's school to reprimand teachers and school
administrators about the incident.
During the course of the confronutk*, Ms.
Serpente went to her son's algebra class. While
class was in session, Ms. Serpente verbally assaulted the instructor, accusing him of irresponsible
conduct toward her son. Shocked by the incident,
the algebra instructor requested Ms. Serpente to
leave the classroom. As she was leaving the room,
Ms. Serpente suddenly stopped at the door, raised
the back of her dress at the teacher, and said,
"To you, sir!" Following this demonstration,
several other confrontational events occurred,
ultimately resulting in the arrest of both Mr. and
Ms. Serpente. Ms. Serpente was charged with
assaulting a police officer, disorderly conduct,
committing unlawful acts in a school, and lewdness involving a child.
At Ms. Serpente's trial, four students from the
algebra class testified but only one was under the
age of fourteen. One of the older students described Ms. Serpente's actions as a * flash* or a
"moon." He stated that as Ms. Serpente left the
classroom, he saw her raise her dress above her
buttocks. When asked if he saw her naked
bottom, the student replied "just a white garment,
that's all I could see." The only witness under age
fourteen at the time of the incident also testified
that he saw white garments and an outline of her
buttocks. When asked if he could see anything
through those garments, he replied, *no, just an
outline." Similarly, the algebra instructor testified
that he saw only her legs and the back of her
thighs. The entire encounter lasted only a few
seconds, and each witness testified that no naked
skin was observed.
At trial, Ms. Serpente moved to dismiss the
lewdness charge claiming her conduct did not
amount to gross lewdness since her acts were not
sexually motivated, nor did she expose her genitals or private parts as required by §76-9702.5. The trial court denied the motion, and Ms.
Serpente was subsequently convicted by a jury of
lewdness involving a child. Ms. Serpente was also
convicted of assaulting a police officer, disorderly
conduct, and committing unlawful acts in a
school. Ms. Serpente does not contest these convictions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the facts of this case are undisputed, the
sole issue on appeal is the construction of §76-9702.5. Therefore, we apply a correction of error
standard. See, e.g., Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp.t
754 P.2d 933,934 (Utah 1988). Morever,
'one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute
should be looked at as a whole and in
light of the gerenaJ purpose it was
intended to serve; and should be so
interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to give
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